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PANEL II: LAWYERING AND DISCLOSURE
AFTER THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

MS. SIEGEL: Good morning, let's continue. I'm Professor Mary Siegel, a professor here at the Washington College of Law of American University.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was crafted by Congress in the aftermath of financial collapses at many corporations including but not limited
to Enron. The law establishes the framework for a new regime of accountability by public companies by imposing new responsibilities not only on
CFOs and CEOs, but also on accountants. New responsibilities, however,
are federal responsibilities. The Act, which went into effect last July, empowered the SEC to issue and implement rules to effectuate the Act's purposes. The SEC has very recently issued rules on key provisions of the act
and other rules are still in the making.
Our first panelist, John Huber, will discuss how these important federal
rules under Sarbanes-Oxley are made, a topic with which he has much
practical experience. Mr. Huber was director of the SEC's Division of
Corporation Finance and was the primary draftsman of the first tender offer
rules and going private rules. He was also in charge of the division's rulemaking program for the integrated disclosure and the shelf-registration
rules. He is a partner at Latham & Watkins. Despite these impressive credentials, my opinion is that the biggest feather in his cap is that he used to
be one of our very successful adjuncts.
Two of our other panelists will discuss several aspects of SarbanesOxley. Some aspects of this new federal law, particularly in the area of
corporate governance and in the regulation of attorneys raise a variety of
questions not the least of which is that they raise fundamental questions
about the ability of the federal government to regulate aspects of law that
throughout our modern history have traditionally been regulated by the
states. In the last decade the Supreme Court has limited the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and other constitutional provisions several times. Moreover, even if properly within the commerce
power, the Supreme Court has struggled about those areas that are traditionally regulated by state law. While we must await the constitutional
challenges that will inevitably occur, we can consider today the wisdom of
what Congress has enacted.
First, Professor Donald Langevoort will discuss how Sarbanes-Oxley
changes the balance of power in the regulation and enforcement of corporate governance. Professor Langevoort was a special counsel in the general
counsel's office of the SEC. He too had the distinguished honor of being a
WCL adjunct before entering academia full time, primarily at Vanderbilt
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Law School and Georgetown Law School. He is the author of numerous
law review articles as well as a casebook on securities regulation and a
treatise on insider trading.
Thereafter, Professor Thomas Hazen will discuss the new rules for lawyers under Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley. After leaving private practice
in New York City, Professor Hazen was a professor at the University of
Nebraska, and is currently at UNC-Chapel Hill Law School. He is the
author of many securities articles, a four-volume treatise on securities
regulation, three different multi-volume works, and several casebooks.
Lastly, Professor Jerry Markham will discuss restructuring of financial
regulatory systems. Professor Markham was an attorney in the general
counsel;s office at the SEC, counsel for the Chicago Board of Options Exchange, and chief counsel for the Division of Enforcement at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. He was in private practice before
joining the faculty at UNC-Chapel Hill. In addition to publishing numerous law review articles, he is the author of three separate treatises and several casebooks. We'll begin with Mr. Huber.
MR. HUBER: Thank you, Mary. When I was chief ofthe Office of Disclosure Policy, which is the predecessor to the Office of Rulemaking in the
division of Corporation Finance at the SEC, I had ten rules of the road that
I used to teach rule writers about their craft. These rules went much further
than just telling a wordsmith to go read the Administrative Procedure Act,
although I recommend that too.
First, I would like to talk about those rules of the road and compare them
then to what is happening now.
Second, I'd like to talk about some of the fundamental changes that have
occurred in rule writing under Sarbanes-Oxley which I'm going to refer to
as "SOX," and third I'd like to really go and quote Commissioner Glassman's rules of the road that she's following and compare them to mine.
My first rule of the road is have the authority to do what you want to do.
That's important. Under the current Sarbanes-Oxley, you hear a great deal
about the Commission implementing the words and the spirit of SarbanesOxley. The concern that I have here is whether the agency is exceeding jurisdiction with respect to rulemaking. Will the rule result in preemption
even if it is not intended to do so of state corporation law, or will it blur the
line between state corporation law and the federal securities laws.
How is the fiduciary duty of a director affected under state corporation
law when explicit duties are established for the director and the director's
committees under federal regulation. An example here, is the audit committee, which is the focal point of more than one section of Sarbanes-
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Oxley. Section 301 of SOX refers to the audit committee in its capacity as
a committee of the board of directors.
While this clause may be read to mean that Congress did not intend to
preempt or interfere with state corporation law, other sections of SOX are
not so clear. Rules that prescribe everything from the qualifications of the
audit committee, and financial experts to what the audit committee should
consider before approving non-audit services by the outside auditor to the
company, raise the issue of the relationship between federal regulation and
state law, regardless of whether the rulemaking takes the form of a Commission rule or a direction to a self-regulatory organization.
Second rule of the road. If you expect others to obey the rules you
adopt, you have to follow the regulations that apply to you during the rulemaking process. Not only is this true now, but. it was true back then. If
you don't do it, the rule can be invalidated and ~an result in people losing
respect for your rule and not supporting it. It is difficult, in the short time
periods with all of the regulations that are now applicable to rulemaking,
for the rule writer to do this.
However, the process is very important, and it's not enhanced by statements, such as the cost-benefit analysis, in the proposed new release to implement Section 404 of SOX. That section would require companies to report on the effectiveness of internal controls and procedures and to include
that report in any reports. The proposing release estimates the compliance
costs for these proposals at five hours per filing and states that the Commission has, "no basis for making the estimate."
Most public companies tell me that their employees and their advisors
will spend untold hours to develop and refine internal controls and procedures and that their compliance costs are going to go up dramatically.
Third rule of the road. What is the purpose you are trying to achieve and
is a rule the best way to achieve it. Is there another means available to accomplish the same results? For example, can an enforcement case, an interpretive release or "no action" letter resolve an issue and achieve the
Commission's purpose without having to adopt a rule that applies to all
public companies and causes every public company to have compliance
costs? Here the rule writer should identify exactly what the rule should accomplish to make sure that the rule is in the best interests of the investors
and the best means to accomplish that public purpose. The first thing here
is to do no harm.
The Commission's response should not be more than is necessary to
achieve the result. Too many rules result in regulatory overload and an inability for the Commission to effectively enforce its rules.
Fourth, keep the rule as simple as possible. While complexity may
sometimes be necessary, such as in the net capital rule, it should not be an
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operating principle of rulemaking. My example here is the Section 16
Rules and [ won't dwell on it. But the advice on any Section 16 rule that is
frequently given to officers, executive officers and directors, is don't do
anything until you consult a lawyer and that lawyer had better be an expert
in Section 16.
Today people are discussing standards based rules for disclosure, controls and procedures to provide more flexibility since one size does not fit
all for companies. There's also much talk about principle-based accounting
rules, which is a major point of discussion between the Commission and
the International Organization of Securities Commissions.
lASCO, Both the SEC and IASCO are trying to achieve convergence
between U.S. and European GAAP. As Bob Herz, who is your luncheon
speaker, has recently stated GAAP will be principle based with some rules
underneath. Ironically, at the same time that the accounting rules are becoming more principle-based and therefore require more not less judgment
from accountants, the Commission is tending towards more detailed and
prescriptive rules in which companies are specifically instructed to disclose
what the Commission wants with less flexibility and less opportunity to apply judgment.
My example there is all of the MD&A proposals from December of
2001 on including the proposals for critical accounting estimates in May of
2002.
Five. Balance the need for investor protection with the cost of compliance. SOX was enacted to restore investor confidence. However, cost of
compliance is also important. An example of the need to have balance is
the metaphor of the safe car. Assume you could build the perfect car, one
that would be one hundred percent safe, and could guarantee the buyer that
he or she would survive any accident. But to be safe, the car would cost a
million dollars. Who would buy it? The moral of the perfect car is that the
cost of rulemaking is important and if it's too high, companies will leave
the reporting systems if they can, and fewer companies will become subject
to the reporting system in the future.
So companies will go private and private companies will not go public.
Moreover, foreign private issuers may choose not to become subject to the
reporting requirements of the Exchange Act, which would defeat the concept of investor protection in the United States. If accommodations are
made for foreign private issuers, you've got competitive questions. There's
also a statute that the Commission has got to make a judgment on the rule's
effect of competition.
If foreign private issuers are exempt from a regulation, what competitive
cost does that put on domestic companies, particularly small and mid-sized
companies which are still required to comply.
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Six. Follow the ripples of your rulemaking. Even if your rule fulfills the
purposes you intend, it can also have unintended consequences. If so, what
are they, and can you build a rule that prevents their occurrence.
Seventh. Be ready to adjust. Recognizing that there may be unintended
consequences that cannot be anticipated before adoption of the rule. Be
ready to look at it and review it after it's been adopted. For example, the
shelf rule, which was the most dramatic part of integrated disclosure was
proposed three times, had hearings held once, was adopted as a temporary
rule before final adoption, and then even after it was adopted in 1983, it
was amended in the late 1990s.
Eighth. Coordinate with other rulemaking bodies to avoid duplication as
well as conflicts. During my tenure at the Commission, the best example
of this was R~gulation D. The Commission coordinated with state commissioners to avoid conflict between federal and state regulation of private
offerings. Today, the challenges are even greater.
To cite two examples, the coordination of federal and state corporation
law and second, the whole idea of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board coordinating with the SEC and the new Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board. Coordination in these areas will affect everything that we
are doing in the future.
Just to add a little bit of zest, that Oversight Board may be setting
GAAS, Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, traditionally done by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, so there's even more of
an audience to contend with.
Ninth. Think long and short term. A rule may address a current need
but could become a burden rather than protect investors in the long term.
And here, all of this rulemaking that everybody was talking about as necessary may become a burden in the future and the regulatory program in the
year 2010.
Tenth. Think big picture. Here the watch-word for the rule writer is to
understand not only where the rule fits into SEC regulation, but how it affects the economy and society in general. If you think that that is something that is just a minor point, we're going to be talking about Section 307
of SOX which will show you exactly how big a point that can be.
With those ten rules of the road, I would submit to you that there are bigticket differences between the past and right now. First, it's a much more
political atmosphere.
Second, what I call the CNBC effect. Everything the Commission is
doing is hitting the front pages as opposed to the business pages and as a
former rule writer, I never liked to hit the newspaper at all.
Third, people are more invested today. You've got more than ffitypercent of the population having an interest in the stock market. Quite
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honestly, that drives a great deal of interest in what the Commission is doing.
Fourth, the Commission is under time deadlines. I'd like to close with a
small part of what I'm talking about in terms of the current area. We're
talking about a very dedicated, hardworking staff at the SEC. They are
good and smart. They are under tremendous pressure and new challenges.
They're led by a Commission that has a Commissioner on it that I'd like to
cite with real favor from my side because as a fellow rule writer, her rules
of the road are something really to look at. Commissioner Glassman recently said, "[I]n evaluating our proposals, the comments we have received
and the Staff's recommendations focus on the following factors.
First, what are the objectives of the rule? Second, will the rule meet our
objectives? Does it go far enough or does it go too far? Third, does it meet
the spirit as well as the letter of the law. Fourth, does it make sense? Are
there likely to be unintended consequences. Are the benefits commensurate with the costs? Fifth, does it raise unrealistic expectations?"
Commissioner Glassman concluded her remarks with, after all the pain
that investors have suffered, the last thing we want to do is to make things
worse. That's why the comments are so important in highlighting pitfalls
and helping us perfect our proposals. And with a philosophy like that I'm
actually very encouraged by what the Commission is doing with respect to
its rulemaking program under SOX.
MS. SIEGEL: Thank you very much. Professor Langevoort.

Mr. Langevoort: What I want to do is talk about the big picture, as John
suggested, and consider the likely spillover effects of Sarbanes-Oxley. I
want to do this in a discretely administrative law-oriented way, taking two
themes that were very visible and driving forces behind the legislation.
The first, as Mary suggested in her opening remarks, is a question about
federalism. It has been common for the last twenty years, at least, to trot
out-as John just did-a distinction between federal and state spheres of
competency. The SEC is on the disclosure side, while the substance of
corporate law (e.g., the mechanics of how decisions are made) is left to the
states. I don't think you can read either the text or the "music" of Sarbanes-Oxley and think that this is much of a viable distinction anymore. If
Congress really believed in the importance of that distinction as a matter of
policy, Sarbanes-Oxley would be a very, very different statute.
If the congressional choice to rethink that attitude toward federalism is
right-and I think it is-then over the next few years we're going to see
ripples in a number of interesting directions. Let's take rulemaking. If you
look back at either judicial interpretations of Rule IOb-5 or questions such
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as whether the SEC can get into the world of corporate governance by pressuring the self-regulatory organizations to use their power in that arena,
you often find a reiteration of the principle I just described. A very famous
case called Business Roundtable v. SEC talks about the history of the '34
Act and then genuflects in front of that notion of a clear separation between
state and federal authority. The question today is if you posed the same issue-does the SEC need Congress' permission to pressure the SRO's or
develop proxy rules that get into the substance of corporate governanceshould the answer come out differently? I think so. Similarly, there are
questions under Rule 10b-5 about whether "simple" mismanagement or
breaches of fiduciary duty are actionable if not disclosed. Many courts
have resisted that, saying that mismanagement is for the states, not the
SEC. My guess is that we will see this notion erode in a way that changes
some of the underlying themes of securities regulation.
The other ripple that I want to talk about has to do with the disclosure
environment itself. We are moving, we are told, toward something called
"real time disclosure." At least the way I teach it to my students, this is the
idea that there is a duty to disclose on a continuous basis all material information that comes into a company's possession. That, however, has
thus far not been the law in two respects. First, the law is clear that disclosure currently is a snapshot-periodic--except with respect to a rare and
small group of circumstances. Second, the law has never insisted on "all"
material information. It has recognized implicitly or explicitly that there
are kinds of confidential information or unripe information that shouldn't
be forced into the disclosure regime because disclosure would hurt investors more than help them.
Even before Sarbanes-Oxley, we were moving toward more real time
disclosure. Sarbanes-Oxley gives a big push in this direction-Section
409, which directs the Commission to talk in terms of "rapid and current
disclosure" of material changes in a company's financial condition, as well
as other portions of the Act. My sense here-and I agree completely with
John-is that there is going to be a temptation for the SEC to take one issue
at a time in a way that leads us to collapse the historic emphasis on periodic
disclosure and make things much more rapid. The 8-K release that adds
more possibilities for what has to be released promptly is one example.
The SEC's certification requirements asking executives to speak not only
to obeying line item requirements but also add everything else necessary to
"present fairly" the condition and operations of the issuer is another. My
question is are we going to a world where we are accelerating the timing of
disclosure and then enlarging the scope of what has to be disclosed such
that we really are imposing a continuous duty to disclose all material information? My sense-and my punch line here-is that there probably is a
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virtue to thinking in those tenns. But, as John said, it has to be done carefully, prudently, in a way that considers second-order and spillover effects,
rather than just addressing the immediate issues. If you look at Australia,
New Zealand and a number of other countries, they have sat down and tried
to tackle, by rule or statute, the question of how far a corporation has to go
in a real time world toward full disclosure. It's not easy to write that rule.
You need very clear thinking to get it right. If Sarbanes-Oxley is pushing
the Commission to engage in more rulemaking in this direction, I hope that
the Commission will be attentive to questions of confidentiality, ripeness,
and cost-without which you can't write a good rule.
MS. SIEGEL: Mr. Hazen?
MR. HAZEN: I'm going to start off with a quote that is very timely, especially in the wake of the Super Bowl. "Just as a fine natural football
player needs coaching in the fundamentals and schooling in the wiles of the
support, so too it takes a corporation lawyer with a heart for the game to
organize a great stock swindle or income tax dodge and drill the financiers
in all the precise details of that play. Otherwise, in their natural enthusiasm
to rush in and grab everything that happens not to be nailed down and
guarded with shotguns, they would soon be part offside and penalized.
And some of the noted financiers who are now immortalized as all time all
American larcenists never would have risen beyond the level of a petty
thief or the short-change man."
This timely quote was made in 1923 in a newspaper observation by
Westbrook Pegler. The reason I mention this is that concerns about the
roles of the attorney and the lawyer in the corporate world are not new concerns. This is an age-old problem. The SEC, since its inception in 1934,
has been regulating lawyers to some extent. It has had rules governing
lawyers since 1935. Even as recently as the 1990s, a very oft-cited quote
today, coming from an opinion by fonner Judge Stanley Sporkin and former SEC Enforcement Director Stanley Sporkin, talking about the scandals
in the savings and loan industry-and this is a paraphrase.
"Where were the lawyers, where were the accountants?" Again, it's not
a new concern to ask to what extent should lawyers operate as gatekeepers.
Namely what is our role as lawyers in preventing these corporate frauds,
especially when you're talking about disclosure issues where lawyers are
filing disclosure documents or at least drafting disclosure documents along
with the client. You have a very sensitive balance that needs to be struck.
Of course Sarbanes-Oxley has accelerated all of this controversy by
mandating some lawyer rules that I'll talk about in a moment. But, again,
this isn't news. As I said, since the mid-thirties, the SEC has looked at
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lawyer conduct at least in terms of regulating the practice before the Commission.
It seems to me you have two issues here. One, a large policy basis.
Should administrative agencies be in the business of regulating lawyer
conduct, especially in terms of practice before that agency?
Second question. Is the wisdom of these particular SEC rules that have
just been adopted clearly going to change the way that corporate securities
lawyers practice? Just to keep this in perspective-and again this is not to
advocate one way or the other for the correctness of this point-this is not
novel. A lot of agencies for a long time had administrative rules governing
what types of lawyering characteristics or what types of conduct qualifies
you for practice before that administrative agency.
Some of the rule requirements are as vague as saying that the agency
may prevent a lawyer from practicing before it, based on unfit character.
Talk about vague guidelines in rulemaking. That certainly would be a
vague guideline. So this too is not new. Those rules have been around for
a long time, but we now have an increased focus on this because of Enron,
because of the new Sarbanes-Oxley Act and because of the new specificity
of the SEC rules that have just been adopted.
Just a little bit by way of background. Certainly most of the panelists
and many in the audience are aware of this already. Of course the SEC has,
in its arsenal of enforcement weapons such as the anti-fraud statutes the
power to go after the lawyers, as well as anybody else, who clearly violates
the securities laws.
The question is, especially with this expansion of the SEC rules, do we
want a heightened standard for lawyers? Congress has certainly said that it
does. Therefore we have a rule that although in the guise of what constitutes proper practice of law, is clearly geared to increase what was talked
about earlier in the first panel. The new rules attempt to put more of a burden on lawyers to help bring to light violations that have occurred or are
occurring.
The SEC has for a long time had a rule, now Rule 102(e), that is more
specific than most agencies in regulating conduct of professionals. It is not
limited to lawyers. It applies to professionals.
It applies equally to accountants, and the SEC has used the rule against
accountants and accounting firms. I haven't made an empirical count, but
my recollection is that the rule has been used more times against accountants than it has against lawyers. Now with these new specific rules mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley, certainly there is a push for the SEC to be looking harder at lawyers. Again, this is not new. The controversy that we
have today is the controversy to what extent should the SEC be regulating
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lawyer conduct. Traditionally, that's been a matter of state bar associations
or state bar committees to regulate lawyer conduct.
Back in the 1970s, the SEC became quite aggressive in trying to regulate
lawyer practice before the Commission. Those efforts died or went away
or were beaten down by the American Bar Association. You can take any
one of those descriptions of what happened. But in the late 1970s, the SEC
backed off from its attempt to regulate and define what constitutes the
proper practice of law before the Commission.
Fast forward to post-Enron, and about a year ago. March 7th 2002-and
this is a little bit of instruction on to some extent how administrative law
can be made-there was a letter sent by a group of law professors, drafted
primarily by a professor at the University of Illinois, Richard Paynter, that
urged the SEC to consider expanding the current Rule 102(e) to define
what constitutes proper practice before the SEC in terms of legal representation.
There was also some discussion in that letter of conforming the SEC rule
to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in terms of the lawyer's
obligation to report within the organization wrongdoing that he believed or
she believed was going on and was not being taken care of properly.
The law professors, and I was one of them who signed the letter, were
not in agreement as to whether the rules should go further and in fact require what is now being called a noisy withdrawal; namely, that at some
point a lawyer must resign from the position and be noisy about it without
breaching client confidences-simply say that he or she was no longer confident in proceeding with the representation.
There was a very quick response from the SEC through the then-general
counsel of the SEC, which said, that the SEC had considered these rules in
the past back in the 1970s. Since 1981, the SEC has taken the position that
it will not get involved in regulating lawyer con,duct, in terms of basically
saying that's something the bar associations do a lot .more efficiently.
The next step in the legislative history of this was Senator John Edwards, the senator from the state in which I currently reside. He had a real
concern for having some involvement in Sarbanes-Oxley, what became
Sarbanes-Oxley, was concerned with what could be done-what might be
added to the legislation.
Senator Edwards was aware of the law professors' letter. His office was
interested in it. He contacted a number of people who had written the letter
and drafted the legislation that is now Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. The drafters of the Act itself accepted Senator Edwards's draft as part
of the legislation, and that's how it became embodied in the law.
What does this statute mandate? The statute is intentionally vague-intentionally vague in the sense that it delegates to the SEC the responsibility
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and the obligation to expand its rules to define what constitutes proper conduct before the Commission.
There was some thought of actually legislatively writing the rule-having a detailed provision in the statute, rather than let the SEC deal with the
tough issues and the nuances. That thought-and I'm not suggesting that
was the thought of Senator Edwards, it was the thought of some of the professors who were involved in the initial letter. Luckily, at least that's my
opinion, that thought dropped out of the process. And the idea became, if
somebody's going to pass these rules, let it be the SEC who can consider
the pros and cons, seek administrative public comment as they have, and
then craft appropriate rules.
There is in the statue, though, one mandate. That mandate is that the
SEC rules at a minimum must contain what is now referred to as an up-theladder requirement. Basically, if a lawyer has sufficient evidence of
wrongdoing in connection with representation of a public company and if
that wrongdoing is material or serious (again, it's not a trivial piece of
wrongdoing) that lawyer does have an obligation to start climbing the corporate ladder and report that.
The up-the-Iadder reporting is within the corporation. Again, not external, not any breach of any attorney-client privilege, but climbing the ladder,
whether it be to a higher executive or whether it be to the audit committee
or whether it be to the board of directors itself now, as the rules are being
implemented. There are likely to be or there will be committees within the
corporation geared solely to hear these types of reports by lawyers. But the
idea being that the lawyer needs to report up-the-Iadder so the corporate
executives who direct this can address the problems in question.
But again, the statute did not attempt to deal with the very tough question of what is the threshold of that reporting requirement.
A couple of words about the SEC rules, and I only have two minutes, so
it will be very few words. The rules also, as proposed, have this noisy
withdrawal requirement that I mentioned earlier; namely, that the lawyer
not only report within the corporation, but if the corporation did not take
appropriate action, that at some point the lawyer might need to resign and
alert the SEC to the effect of the resignation.
Those rules, not surprisingly, were highly controversial. The ABA and
many other lawyers opposed them significantly. The SEC did not take
those proposals off the table. They are still considering the noisy withdrawal requirement but did not put them in the rulemaking that was just
adopted.
There was also some concern among the lawyers that the SEC standards
for the threshold of reporting within the corporation were too vague and
therefore needed some more guidance. The SEC's response-and I guess
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John talked earlier about the agency following its own rules, and I'm afraid
in this sense it broke at least one of its rules. It adopted a double negative.
The reason I say it violated one of its rules and in its plain English requirements, the SEC cautions for us not to engage in a double negative.
But the double negative is that a lawyer must start climbing the ladder
when it would be unreasonable not to conclude that a material violation has
not occurred.
There has been a lot of controversy about whether this is an effective enforcement tool, whether it's too vague on the one hand. I think this probably is going to be difficult to enforce. Does that make it a bad rule? It
makes it a bad rule to the extent that there may not be that much enforcement action.
On the other hand, one clear message that is coming through from 307
and the SEC rules even as vague as they may be, is a consciousness raising
effort. Namely, that lawyers practicing before the SEC, and I know many
securities lawyers who are already aware of this level of consciousness,
doing public disclosure work, need to really be thinking about are my eyes
open? Are my ears open? Is there something here that smells bad? Should
I do something about it, at least in terms of talking to people within the organization?
I really don't want to go overtime. There was a handout when I walked
in, an article I guess. It was just in today's or yesterday's paper about the
SEC lawyer rules. I suggest you take a look at it, because it does point out
that the nature of law practice is going to change, that we now have a new
industry in corporate compliance work, and that's going to be the question
of when lawyers need to start reporting up this corporate ladder.
MS. SIEGEL: Thank you very much. Mr. Markham?
MR. MARKHAM: Over the years I've been told that the federal securities laws were designed for certain purposes. One was to stop a market run
up in the 1920s, to stop fraud and to assure for an accurate accounting of
the companies for public investors.
One market bubble later, 650 restatements from major public corporations, and thousands and thousands of cases of fraud, some on a scale so
massive as to defy imagination, it's very clear that the federal securities
laws have failed in their purposes. We need to revisit them. We have done
that in other areas.
In the banking area, we've looked at the Glass-Steagall prohibitions or
restrictions on commercial banks and investment bankers combining their
operations that were passed as part of the New Deal as well. Those restrictions were repealed.
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In the commodity area, again, more 1930s legislation. The Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 repealed the commodity exchange monopoly that they'd enjoyed for many years and deregulated the over-thecounter derivatives markets, a substantial part of our financial industry
these days. And we still have no federal regulation of insurance in our
country.
Why are we not reexamining the federal securities laws instead of trying
to patch them to add more regulation on? It didn't work before. I think the
reason is there are several myths out there. When we talk about federal securities laws, we have to drop our voice an octave, put them in quotes.
They're very sacred sort of things. And those myths are, that I've heard
through the years, that the federal securities laws are responsible for creating the largest financial system in the world.
That's not true. We had that largest financial system in the world before
the adoption of federal securities laws. We had achieved it by World War
I. During that war, we financed a large part of the expenditures of the
English in that war, of the French and the Germans, before we went to fight
them. And then J.P. Morgan and crew solid liberty bonds to finance the
U.S. efforts in that war. We were truly in a dominant position in the financial markets of the world by the end of World War J.
Second myth, the stock market crash of 1929 caused the Great Depression. I don't think there's any living economist, with the possible exception of John Kenneth Galbraith, who takes that position today. They
mostly say it was a factor. Well, the weather was a factor too, but that was
not something that we can tie it to.
The next myth, number three, is that the federal securities laws allowed
the markets to recover, regain confidence by investors in the markets and
allowed our markets to operate again. Well, I don't know how you can say
that. First of all, it was the Great Depression, and these statutes were
passed there. We had no other depression that lasted that long, although
one in 1893 was close.
Did the federal securities laws bring us out of that? No they didn't. We
had the capital strikes after the passage and later had another capital strike
in 1937 after the attacks by Franklin Roosevelt on the financiers. It did
nothing that we can see to encourage recovery in the market. In fact, the
markets did not regain their 1929 high until 1954. 1 don't see how we can
say that that myth is true.
Next myth, the federal securities laws assure full disclosure. Well,
we've already seen that that has not happened. We do not have full disclosure. The number of restatements coming out has been absolutely incredible, and also the myth of the market bubble. We had a bubble. The federal
securities laws did not prevent that.
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Why have they failed? Why did they not meet their goals? I think the
the answer is-I don't want to say it's simple. I don't want to say it's
clear. But in my thinking, it's because we rely on the accountants. The
SEC does not have enough staff to go out and examine firms, extrapolating
out what the big five, plus the other accounting firms that do public company work, it would take adjusting for government efficiency. We're talking about a million additional government employees to assure full disclosure. And I guarantee you, even then they're not going to get it all.
No one is going to approve a million additional government employees
for such a goal. What has the SEC done instead? They've used accountants as their policemen. They've required the certification of public statements as the means to assure that there will be accurate disclosure, and
during that process, they've tried to tum the accountant into the cop on the
beat, who would go out and do that investigative work for them.
And now we've got legislation requiring them to disclose violations.
And with Sarbanes-Oxley, even more onerous provisions. stuck on these
accountants. What is an accountant? What do they do and who are they?
How do we think that they can be these kind of policemen? Remember, the
SEC and the U.S. Attorney's offices with all their resources, subpoena
power, they didn't uncover these frauds. The market did. How are these
accountants going to do this?
What is an auditor? I'd like to quote from a decision by the Supreme
Court of California, Miley v. Arthur Young & Co. "An auditor is a watchdog, not a bloodhound." As a matter of commercial reality, an auditor performs in a client-controlled environment. The fundamental and primary
responsibility for the accuracy of financial stateJTlents rest upon management.
The client engages the auditor, pays for the audit and communicates with
audit personnel through the engagement, because. the auditor cannot in the
time available become an expert in the client's business and record-keeping
systems. The client necessarily furnishes the information basis for this
audit. And if we have an accounting rotation, it's going to put it even more
in the hands of the managers of the company.
But even with all of that, there are other flaws. Again, accounting
statements give you only a snapshot, and it's backward looking as to what
the company has done. We're dependent on management entirely for projections and forecasts of what is to come.
An accountant, as I said before, is not a trained investigator. They don't
know how to conduct an investigation. They don't have the power to grant
immunity. They don't have the power to subpoena. What they do is a very
basic verification of some of the company's activities. They kick a few
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tires, not much else. That is not enough to uncover a complicated fraud
where the management has control of the books and records.
The new accounting board, "peek-a-boo", is designed to bludgeon these
accountants a bit more. And we've seen in recent SEC statements how
we're going to attack the accounting firms if one of their auditor's doesn't
measure up. We've seen the actions against Arthur Anderson. We're going to beat them into submission to make them be policemen whether they
want to be or not. I don't think it's going to work, but I could be wrong.
A new regulatory model is needed, and I don't think it has to be a very
complicated one. Information is a commodity. It's got value. Like any
commodity, it should be purchased and sold. We do this every day.
Americans own a lot of stock. But sixty-seven percent of American families, the last time I looked at the numbers, owned homes. They go out and
purchase a home.
They don't get a certified financial statement from somebody when they
purchase that home. What they basically get in some states, several states,
is a disclosure form in which the owner may, if desired, check a box disclosing defects in the home. And if they go in and get a mortgage, they
sign another group of documents. If you've ever gone through this process,
you don't know what they say, but you sign them anyway, to be sure there
are some disclosures in there, including the magical APR, which I've never
yet been able to figure out, the Truth in Lending regulations.
We allow people to buy their homes without all this massive information. Why are we making this requirement as a part of stock purchases for
investors in the marketplace? Why don't we treat this as a commodity?
Now. We've had a lot of labeling laws for commodities. We have labeling
laws for alcohol, warnings. We have labeling laws for cigarettes for
warnings. I think there is a Wool Act, a Fur Act, a Hazardous Substance
Act and the Lanham Act on country of origin and some others. But we label and disclose the contents and things. But these are very basic disclosures. It's nothing like we pretend to have under the federal securities
laws.
What would happen in a commodity-based -regimen where we had a
commodity model for this information? Well, there's the old Suprel11e
Court case of Laidlaw v. Oregon, where Justice Marshall told us how it
would be. There an individual obtained the information about the signing
of the Treaty of Ghent from some British sailors. He immediately realized
the value of that information and went and bought tobacco, knowing the
price is going to immediately rise with the knowledge that the treaty had
been signed. And indeed, it did rise substantially, fifty-some percent when
that knowledge became know.
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Justice Marshall said there's no duty on the part of this individual to disclose that information. He gathered that information. He used the information. He had no duty to disclose. But he could not mislead the individual. And the individual asserted that he had asked if there had been any
news that might affect the price of tobacco, and the purchaser had said
there was none, and the case went back to trial on that issue.
That would be a commodity-based model. Now of course the controversial issue is insider information. How would that fit in the model? Would
it be a free market approach where you could buy and sell and trade on it?
Well, I don't know. We can still debate that. But the commodity model
fits the misappropriation theory pretty nicely. You can't steal a commodity. And if you steal information, just as you could any other commodity,
you could be prosecuted for that.
MS. SIEGEL: Thank you. Wonderful presentations. Do you have any
questions? Yes?
VOICE: I've got one for Professor Hazen. I was just wondering, I've
been speaking to some in-house counsels in some different companies for
some research. What they were telling me is, they're trying to comply with
Sarbanes-Oxley. They're trying to come up with disclosure packets for
every transaction that's occurring in the business.
And when they're speaking to the top attorneys, the top counsel, they
said, well, how much am I supposed to disclose? How much is supposed to
be going in this report? And they would ultimately say, well, anything substantial or substantive, which covers just about everything.
When do you think there might be a rule clarification where we're able
to say okay, this is too much, this is what's necessary, and this is what
you'd better put in, otherwise you'll get in serious trouble?
MR. HAZEN: A total clarification, my short answer would be never. I
think the last part of your question, though, I think is a very good one. And
this gets to John's point and Don's as well. If you're going to be having
rulemaking, especially in this particular area, it can be very helpful, especially when you're mandating disclosure, to at least say A, B, C, and 0
have to be disclosed
I think the problem that comes up and the evidence at least with 307 is
now this double negative I mentioned, is when you're trying to take the big
picture in a single standard, reasonably believe or does not reasonably believe, et cetera, or as you say, substantial or material, those guidelines just
don't fall into a bright line test.
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So there's always going to be some degree of uncertainty. The hope is
to get rules that can provide as much certainty as possible in the clear areas
at the margins, and maybe that will help give definition to the what is substantial, what is material, what is not unreasonable, to use the SEC's language.
MR. HUBER: In the 1970s, the Supreme Court clarified materiality to
be a "would test". After that for about fifteen years until Levinson v. Basic,
that was really the test. In 1999, the Commission came out with Staff Accounting Bulletin 99, which first was only applicable to financial statements, but after a Second Circuit.decision in 2000, may be applicable to
more than financial statements.
My point is, even before Sarbanes-Oxley rulemaking, the concept of
materiality has in my mind been degraded. And it's degraded into more
and more stuff, all right. In Sarbanes-Oxley, what you've now got, and the
Commission is sitting here with proposals in one of my favorite rules,
MD&A, Item 303 on Regulation S-K to the concept of reasonable likelihood.
And this is really important to me because the precision of writing a rule
to elicit disclosure is the hallmark of what a good rule does. And the fact
of the matter is, the concept of reasonably likely, if you look at the new release that came out two days ago on auditors, and it really has got more to
do with audit committees, it talks about the concept-now get this-put
your arms around this thought. What is reasonably likely to be material,
okay.
What is reasonably likely to be material. First of all, what's material is
the first step. The second step is what's reasonably likely to be material.
Now I do this for a living. I write this stuff. Whoever is the, "counsel" that
your companies are talking to, okay, doesn't know the answer. And I'm
telling you that the answer is changing to be more and more information
and you put together what Professor Langevoort talked about with respect
to current disclosure, the two trend lines in this area are quicker disclosure.
So it's quicker, okay. And I've got to tell you a secret. Human beings
can't meet that test. You're setting up a pattern of disclosure policy where
it's not going to be capable of being done, and then in five years, somebody
is going to have a Senate hearing someplace, where were you on the night
of the 24th and you missed the disclosure? Well, I was asleep, because on
the night of the 23rd, I was writing the disclosure.
And that is a system that is untenable to me as a practitioner. It's the
wrong way to address the problems that we saw in 2000.
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MS. SIEGEL: I want to address a quick question to Professor
Langevoort. You talked about the traditional dichotomy between the federal and the state law being disclosure management and how SarbanesOxley clearly changes that. What do you see as either the new line, or are
you seeing a preemption?
MR. LANGEVOORT: Certainly not preemption, but concurrent jurisdiction that allows either state or federal law to top the other. If we assume-which I think is Congress's expectation-that federal law will usually be more aggressive, it will do the topping by imposing a more rigorous
standard. As I've implied, I've never really believed that what the Supreme Court and others courts kept saying about the federalist line of separation ever made any sense. It was not a tenable line. Thus I'm thrilled
that Sarbanes-Oxley causes us to recognize that so long as the SEC is targeting deception, it can police the full range of corporate governance. I'm
happy with that, but it is going to be a big change in the law.
MS. SIEGEL: Other questions?
VOICE: A question for Mr. Markham. You mentioned you would like
to go more towards a commodity-based approach toward disclosure. Could
you just elaborate a little further on that? I don't quite understand how you
would, I guess, get rid of the current approach and make it more towards a
commodity-based approach. You said in the absence of being misled that
would suffice.
MR. MARKHAM: I think the commodity-based approach, you could
see the CFTC, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, as an example. What they did is require disclosure in a one-page statement of the risks
of trading commodity futures contracts. They're very stark. They would
curl your hair. And that's what the consumer gets. They don't get a financial disclosure about pork bellies or soy beans. That would be the extent of
it.
There would also be the fraud prohibition. We don't allow you to commit fraud in the marketplace, and we've got Rule IOb-5 and those other
provisions for that to prevent fraud. Otherwise, we would not have a disclosure requirement where you have to give certified financial statements if
you're going to give the public the appearance that those financial statements are guaranteed accurate. They're not. I don't know if that added
any structure.
MS. SIEGEL: I want to thank this wonderful panel.
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